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DE FACTO SEGREGATION IN LOW-RENT
PUBLIC HOUSING
I. INTRODUCTION
Low-rent public housing was permanently established as a federal
program by the United States Housing Act of 1937.1 This Act pro-
vides for the operation of low-rent housing facilities by local public
housing agencies2 and authorizes annual federal financial contribu-
tions3 to these agencies to make up the differences between operating
costs and rent receipts from project tenants. The primary criterion
for admission to low-rent facilities is the financial need of the appli-
cant.4 One problem in the administration of low-rent housing not
covered by the federal statute-and a problem which has aroused much
dissatisfaction-is the extent to which public housing projects have
become racially segregated.5 In view of recent trends toward improv-
ing the racial mix in the private housing stock,8 segregation in public
housing invites analysis and discussion.
1. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888. Earlier federal programs had
provided housing for certain groups during World War I and the early Depression
years. Comment, Discrimination in Low Rent Housing, 64 MicH. L. REv. 871,
873, n. 14 (1966). The present law is in 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
2. "The term 'public housing agency' means any State, county, municipality,
or other governmental entity or public body (excluding the Administration), which
is authorized to engage in the development or administration of low-rent housing or
slum clearance." 42 U.S.C. § 1402(11) (1964).
3. "The Administration may make annual contributions to public housing agen-
cies to assist in achieving and maintaining the low-rent character of their housing
projects." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (Supp. II, 1966).
4. "The dwellings in low-rent housing shall be available solely for families of
low income. [I~ncome limits for occupancy and rents shall be fixed by the public
housing agency and approved by the Administration after taking into consideration
(A) the family size, composition, age, physical handicaps, and other factors which
might affect the rent-paying ability of the family, and (B) the economic factors
which affect the financial stability and solvency of the project." 42 U.S.C. §
1402(1) (Supp. II, 1966).
5. Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public Housing, 35 TEmp. L. Q.
163, 175-78 (1962); Comment, Discrimination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note
1, at 871-73, 875. Note, Discrimination Against Minorities in the Federal
Housing Programs, 31 IND. L. J. 501 (1956). See Flipper, De Facto Segregation
in Public Housing, Appendix (unpublished manuscript on file in Washington Uni-
versity School of Law Library, May, 1966).
6. The past year, for example, has seen a substantial increase in the number of
states with fair housing laws applicable to all or part of the private housing market.
Twenty-one states now have such legislation. Trends in Housing, May, 1967, at p.
1, col. 1.
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In some communities, especially in the South, segregation has re-
sulted from the formal, official policies of the local authority, either
in tenant selection and assignment, or site selection. 7 However, even
where there has been no overt discrimination by the local authority,
segregation has been produced de facto.8 That is, segregation has not
resulted from conscious and formal policies of the local authority,
but has been a product of the distribution of housing racially within
the community. The purpose of this paper is to look into the prob-
lem of de facto segregation in public housing to determine the con-
stitutional duty of the local authority to eliminate de facto patterns,
and to consider what administrative steps dealing with de facto segre-
gation are constitutionally permissible.
A. The Problem
De facto patterns of segregation in public housing are largely a
product of the economic status of Negroes and the distribution of
Negroes in the urban core. In 1963, nearly one-half of the non-
white families living in the United States had incomes of less than
$3,000.9 Census figures for the five largest Standard Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas indicate that from 86% to 89% of Negroes living in
these areas reside within the central city.10 Because large numbers
of Negro families reside in the urban core, many have been displaced
by urban renewal and related community demolition and rehabilita-
tion programs. What emerges from these figures is the simple fact
that the incidence of eligible and preferred categories of applicants
for low-rent public housing is disproportionately high among Negroes.
To define what de facto segregation means in a context where the
legislation aids a class composed predominantly of Negroes is an
enormously difficult task.
Some of the difficulties encountered by local housing authorities
pursuing non-discriminatory site selection and tenant selection and
7. Comment, Discrimination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note 1, at 871-73,
875-76. See Flipper, supra note 5, Appendix.
8. Comment, Discrimination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note 1, at 872-73.
See Flipper, supra note 5, Appendix.
9. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 344 (86th ed. 1965).
10. ADVISORY CoMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS IN CENTRAL CITIES AND SUBURBS 234-49 (1965).
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assignment policies are squarely raised by the following hypothetical
problem.
Suppose, for example, that a local authority wishes to construct and
operate two low-rent housing projects and to avoid racial segregation.
The authority looks for sites which will not, by reason of proximity
to all-white or all-Negro neighborhoods, affect the racial composition
of the projects. Two sites are chosen, each in a neighborhood evenly
divided between Negro and white residents. Identical projects are con-
structed.1" Pursuant to its non-discriminatory policy, the authority
adopts an open occupancy plan which permits applicants to state their
preference in project assignment when they apply.12 Assignment to
projects is made at random as vacancies occur. The projects are com-
pleted, applications are accepted, and the projects begin to fill. Then
a shift in racial patterns of residence occurs. One of the mixed
neighborhoods turns all-Negro and the other becomes all-white. Ap-
plication preferences for project accommodations are affected. Soon,
only white applicants indicate a preference and will accept assign-
ment in the project located in the all-white neighborhood. Only
Negro applicants indicate a preference and will accept assignment in
the project located within the all-Negro neighborhood. The projects
soon become racially segregated.
Assuming that the local authority considers the racial mix undesir-
able and wishes to adopt administrative measures which will produce
a change, several questions can be asked. What administrative mea-
sures can be devised to eliminate the de facto pattern? Will the rem-
edy adopted by the housing authority fall within the ambit of what
is constitutionally permissible? For example, may the authority force-
assign tenants to project accommodations in order to alter the racial
mix in a project? On the other hand, does the constitution command
that the local authority act affirmatively to eliminate the de facto seg-
regation? Or does the constitutional mandate extend no further than
to require that tenants and sites be selected in a non-discriminatory
manner? These questions will be discussed in the following pages,
in light of the controlling federal statutes and regulations, and the
case law.
11. Throughout this article, it is assumed that project integration is meaningful
only for projects at or over a certain size. For purposes of this discussion, the
writers believe that racial integration by project is meaningful only for projects
which house 200 families or more. Until recently, at least in large cities, the ten-
dency to build projects of this size or larger was the dominant pattern.
12. For discussion of free choice tenant selection and assignment plans, see the
text at notes 63-73, infra.
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B. Statutory Background
Maximum responsibility for the administration of the federally-
assisted low-rent public housing program is vested in local public
housing authorities.13 Pursuant to state enabling legislation,14 local
authorities contract directly with the Housing Assistance Administra-
tion of the Department of Housing and Urban Development s for
annual financial contributions. Unlike programs in which the federal
government makes a one-time grant to a local recipient,'6 the contrac-
tual federal-local relationship in public housing may continue for a
period of sixty years.17 As a result, conditions written into the annual
contributions contract between the federal agency and the local au-
thority provide a continuing opportunity for federal leverage over
local project administration.
Eligibility criteria are stated in the federal statute. Families of low
income 8 are alone 9 eligible for low-rent public housing. Although
13. "It is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public housing
agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-
rent housing program, including responsibility for the establishment of rents and
eligibility requirements (subject to the approval of the Authority), with due con-
sideration to accomplishing the objectives of this chapter while effecting econo-
mies." 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
14. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 55:14A-4 (1964) (provides for creation of housing
authorities by resolution of local governing body) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 1544
(1964) (creates housing authorities for each city and county, to become operative
upon finding of need by local governing body or Governor).
15. The United States Housing Authority was created in 1937 to administer
the low-rent housing program. 50 Stat. 889 (1937). In 1947, the functions of
the Authority were transferred to the Housing and Home Finance Agency and its
name changed to the Public Housing Administration. Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1947, 5 U.S.C. § 13 3 y-16 (1964). In 1965, the functions of the Public Housing
Administration were transferred to a newly created Department of Housing and
Urban Development. 5 U.S.C. § 624c (Supp. II, 1966). The responsible agency
is now known as the Housing Assistance Administration.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (1964) (urban renewal).
17. "In no case shall any contract for annual contributions be made for a
period exceeding sixty years: Provided, That, in the case of projects initiated after
March 1, 1949, contracts for annual contributions shall not be made for a period
exceeding forty years from the date the first annual contribution for the project
is paid ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(c) (Supp. II, 1966).
18. The current statute provides that "families of low income" means "fami-
lies (including elderly and displaced families) who are in the lowest income group
and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their locality
or metropolitan area to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings for their use." 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (Supp. II, 1966). Most amend-
ments of this sub-section have altered the definition of "families," "elderly fami-
lies," and "displaced families." However, the description of "families of low
income" has remained the same.
19. "[D]wellings in low-rent housing shall be available solely for families of low
income." 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. II, 1966).
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the formula for determining income ceilings has undergone change,2 0
this economic test remains the sole criterion for eligibility. However,
statutory preferences 21 in admission policies have distorted the demo-
graphic characteristics of low-rent tenants. The pressure of large num-
bers of preferred applicants and a shortage of low-rent accommoda-
tions have worked to exclude otherwise eligible applicants from pub-
lic housing. The present statute requires local authorities in deter-
mining the order of admission to consider the applicant's status as a
person displaced by urban renewal or other governmental action, as
a serviceman or veteran, and his health, age and family size.22 It
20. The original Act provided that net income of families "at the time of ad-
mission [shall] not exceed five (sic) times the rental (including the value or cost
to them of heat, light, water, and cooking fuel), of the dwellings. . . ." Act of
Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, § 2(1), 50 Stat. 888; this section was twice amended to
provide exemptions in computing net income. Act of July 15, 1949, ch. 338,
§ 306, 63 Stat. 429; Act of July 12, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-104, § 401 (a), 71 Stat.
301. The present provision, which appeared in a slightly modified form in the
Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, § 503(a) (1), 73 Stat. 680, now reads
"[Ijncome limits for occupancy and rents shall be fixed by the public housing
agency and approved by the Authority after taking into consideration (A)the
family size, composition, age, physical handicaps, and other factors which might
affect the rent-paying ability of the family, and (B) the economic factors which
affect the financial stability and solvency of the project." 42 U.S.C. § 1402 (1)
(Supp. II, 1966).
21. Preferences in tenant selection were first introduced by the Act of July 15,
1949, ch. 338, § 302, 63 Stat. 423, which provided that preferences be extended
to 1) "families .. . displaced by any low-rent housing project or by any slum-
clearance or redevelopment project .. .and as among such families" first prefer-
ence should be given families of disabled veterans, second preference to families
of deceased veterans and servicemen, and third preference to families of other
veterans and servicemen; 2) "families of other veterans and servicemen and as
among such families" first preference should be given to families of disabled vet-
erans, second preference to families of deceased veterans and servicemen. Gen-
erally, "veterans" and "servicemen" are persons who have served in the "active
military" during World Wars I and II and in the Korean conflict. Act of Oct.
26, 1951, ch. 577, § 1, 65 Stat. 647; Presidential Proclamation No. 3080, 20 Fed.
Reg. 173, January 7, 1955.
In 1954, the class of preferred "displaced families" was extended by including
in addition to persons described in the Act of July 15, 1949, families displaced by
an "urban renewal project, or through action of a public body or court, either
through the enforcement of housing standards or through the demolition, closing,
or improvement of dwelling units." Provisions relating to veterans and servicemen
remained the same. Act of Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, § 401 (2), 68 Stat. 631. The
present provision appeared, with slight modification, in the Act of June 30, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 205(a), 75 Stat. 164.
22. "[The public housing agency shall adopt and promulgate regulations estab-
lishing admission policies which shall give full consideration to its responsibility
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should be noted, however, that for a long period of time the preference
in favor of displaced families was absolute.23 Viewed against the back-
drop of economic and demographic data presented earlier, the statu-
tory eligibility structure itself seems to explain, at least in part, why
admission policies tend to favor Negroes disproportionately.
The Housing Act of 1937 did not prohibit racial discrimination in
low-rent public housing.24 For the most part, state enabling legisla-
tion remained silent on the point-25 Generally, racial discrimination
has been attacked collaterally by civil rights legislation.26 A few state
statutes and local fair housing ordinances27 apply to public housing.
They are not considered in this article, which is limited to the impact
of federal civil rights action on the public housing program.
for the rehousing of displaced families, to the applicant's status as a serviceman or
veteran or relationship to a serviceman or veteran or to a disabled serviceman or
veteran, and to the applicant's age or disability, housing conditions, urgency of
housing need, and source of income: Provided, That in establishing such admis-
sion policies the public housing agency shall accord to families of low income such
priority over single persons as it determines to be necessary to avoid undue hard-
ship." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (2) (1964). For definitions of who is included in a
"Family" see 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (Supp. II, 1966). The policy to provide for
larger families is not new, for in the original legislation Congress declared that
"In the development of low-rent housing it shall be the policy of the United States
to make adequate provision for larger families and for families consisting of elderly
persons." 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
23. This was the case from 1949 until 1961, when the present provision was
substantially enacted.
24. It has been suggested that refusal to prohibit racial discrimination by public
housing agencies was prompted in part by fear of losing Southern political sup-
port for the low-rent housing program. Comment, Discrimination in Low-Rent
Housing, supra, note 1, at 871, 875. See, Mulvihill, Problems in the Management
of Public Housing, supra note 5, at 163. For a discussion of subsequent proposed
amendments to prohibit discrimination see Note, Discrimination Against Minorities
in the Federal Housing Programs, supra note 5, at 501, 502, n. 13.
25. Initial enabling legislation frequently did not mention racial discrimination
in low-rent public housing. E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 1544-53 (1964). In
some states, a non-discrimination requirement has been incorporated into the
enabling act by amendment. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 55:14-A7.5 (1964) (added
1950); N.Y. Pub. Housing Law, § 223 (McKinney 1955) (added 1945).
26. E.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 18(a) McKinney's Supp. 1966); N.Y. Exec.
Law § 296 (McKinney's Supp. 1966).
27. For a collection of state fair housing laws and municipal fair housing ordi-




II. TENANT SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT
A. Judicial Reaction to Quota Systems
Up to 1954,28 the constitutional law doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,0
that separate but equal facilities for whites and Negroes was constitu-
tionally permissible, chartered the racial policies of local public hous-
ing authorities.30 For most of this period, the federal Public Housing
Administration (predecessor to the present Housing Assistance Ad-
ministration) left the problem of accommodating both races to local
authorities, while sanctioning segregated facilities.31 One issue arising
out of deliberate segregation of Negroes was the number of units to
be set aside for non-white use.32 Early federal regulations required
that the local admission policy "reflect equitable provision for [the]
eligible families of all races, determined on the approximate volume
and urgency of their respective needs for [low-rent] housing." 33 To
implement the "equitable provision" requirement, many authorities
turned to quota systems.
A simple plan was to evenly divide available dwelling units between
Negro and white applicants. A more complex "neighborhood. com-
position" plan had several variations. Originally, this plan established
an occupancy ratio for public housing projects which reflected the
ratio between Negroes and whites in the neighborhood in which the
project was located. More equitable versions of the "neighborhood
composition" plan constructed occupancy ratios from the proportion
of whites and Negroes living in the community at large, instead of in
the immediate neighborhood of a project. One of these "community
ratio" plans established an occupancy ratio based upon the proportion
of whites to Negroes living in the community; another constructed
an occupancy ratio from the proportion of whites to Negroes in the
community who were eligible for public housing. Each of these quota
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. Comment, Discrimination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note 1, at 871, 875;
Note, Discrimination Against Minorities in the Federal Housing Programs, supra
note 5, at 501, 502-03.
31. Note, Discrimination Against Minorities in the Federal Housing Programs,
;upra note 5, at 501, 503, n. 15.
32. Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public Housing, supra note 5,
at 163; Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L. J. 30 (1960).
33. Public Housing Administration, Low-Rent Housing Manual § 102.1 (Feb.
21, 1951), (hereinafter cited as MANUAL); Note, Discrimination Against Minoritie
in the Federal Housing Programs, supra note 5, at 501, 503, n. 14.
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plans was the subject of litigation in the early 1950's. In Woodbridge
v. Evansville Housing Authority,4 where the facts showed that more
Negroes lived in substandard housing than whites, the court held that
a fifty-fifty quota between whites and Negroes denied equal protection
of the laws. In Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco35 the
court rejected a plan which retained local "neighborhood composi-
tion" ratios for existing projects, but which proposed to allocate units
in all new construction so that the ratio of whites to Negroes even-
tually residing in all the Authority's accommodations would equal the
ratio of needy whites to needy Negroes living in the San Francisco
area.38 The court's decision to open all Authority accommodations
to all eligible applicants regardless of race,3 7 implicitly rejected both
the "neighborhood composition" quota plan and the more equitable
"community ratio" concept. Although the precise basis of the decision
is not clear, the court presented several reasons in the course of a
lengthy opinion. First, quotas recognize only group rights, contrary
to the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment protects personal
rights.3 8 Second, quotas exclude from low-rent housing eligible per-
sons given statutory preference by Congress.3 9 Third, the court found
the plan deficient because it did not meet standards evolved under
the "separate but equal" doctrine.40 Fourth, the plan constituted
state preservation of neighborhood racial patterns in violation of the
spirit enunciated by the racially Restrictive Covenant Cases.4' In
Taylor v. Leonard, 4 Negro applicants were admitted to segregated
34. Civil No. 618, S. D. Ind. (1953).
35. 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert denied, 347 U.S. 974
(1954).
36. A survey showed that the ratio of need between whites and non-whites was
70/30. However, at the time the new plan was proposed less than 30 per cent
of the Authority's housing was allocated to non-whites.
37. 120 Cal. App. 2d at 4, 5, 260 P.2d at 670. Actually this statement was
part of the lower court's holding which was affirmed by the District Court of
Appeal
38. Id. at 8, 9, 260 P.2d at 673.
39. Id. at 9, 260 P.2d. at 673.
40. Id. at 9-17, 260 P.2d at 673-678. The court discussed the line of cases
interpreting the separate but equal doctrine enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), and rejected the result in Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743
(E.D. Pa. 1941).
41. 120 Cal. App. 2d at 14-15, 260 P.2d at 676-79. E.g., Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917); City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied 341 U.S. 940 (1951).
42. 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Ch. 1954).
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facilities in the same proportion as Negroes living in the community.
In striking down the quota, the court found violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the New Jersey Constitution, and the New Jersey
housing authority enabling statute. 43
Although the courts in Woodbridge, Taylor and Banks found
quotas inherently repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment,"4 the con-
stitutionality of quota admission policies in low-rent public housing
is still unsettled. The facts in those cases indicate that there were ade-
quate non-constitutional grounds for decision and that the court need
not have reached the constitutional question. A few cases have upheld
quotas, 45 and the United States Supreme Court has declined to resolve
the split in opinion. Moreover, the constitutional issue is unlikely
to reach the Supreme Court again, because Congressional legislation
and implementing regulations have defined the duty of a local author-
ity vis-a-vis applicants for low-rent housing.47
43. "The evil of a quota system is that it assumes that Negroes are different
from other citizens and should be treated differently. Stated another way, the
alleged purpose of a quota system is to prevent Negroes from getting more than
their share of the available housing units. However, this takes for granted that
Negroes are only entitled to the enjoyment of civil rights on a quota basis." Id.
at 119, 103 A.2d at 633.
44. In Banks and Taylor, at least, the opinions indicate adequate state grounds
for decision. In Banks, the court found that the plan violated statutory preferences
for admission to low-rent housing. In Taylor, the court found violations of both
state statute and the state constitution. It is interesting to note that both the
California and New Jersey courts have upheld the use of quotas to achieve integra-
tion in public schools. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876,
382 P.2d 818 (1963) ; Booker v. Board of Educ. of City of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 161,
212 A.2d 1 (1965); Morean v. Board of Educ. of Montclair, 42 N.J. 237, 200
A.2d 97 (1964). For an exhaustive treatment of the public school quota cases
see, De Facto Segregation of Races in Public Schools, 11 A.L.R.3d 780 (1967).
45. Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (approving 20 per
cent Negro quota in one project when, considering community needs, projects
were overoccupied by Negroes); Kankakee County Housing Authority v. Spurlock,
3 Il1.2d 277, 120 N.E.2d 561 (1954) (two to one quota approved when "racial
equity" suggested four to one ratio) ; Miers v. Housing Authority of City of Dallas,
266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (3/3/1 quota for whites, Negroes and
Latin Americans upheld). See also, Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222
(7th Cir. 1961) revzg 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of a quota regulating the racial composition of a proposed housing sub-
division).
46. Certiorari was denied in the Banks case, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
47. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964);
HOUSING AND HoME FINANCE AGENCY, NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY-As-
SISTED PROGRAS-EFFECTUATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIOHTS ACT OF
1964, 24 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1964). PUBLIC HoUsING ADmINISTRATION, CIRCULAR TO
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
B. The Federal Executive Order
Although the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education4s
had discarded the doctrine of separate but equal,49 at least in the pub-
lic schools,50 the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Banks5
case, which came up at the same time, spurred speculation that the
Brown holding did not extend beyond education. 52 Even though a
few state and lower federal courts have found racial discrimination
in public housing unconstitutional, 53 segregation in public housing
was virtually unaffected by the 1954 Brown decision. 54 Federal Execu-
tive Order No. 11063, 55 "Equal Opportunity in Housing," was the
executive response to judicial reticence.
This Order directed the executive departments "to prevent" racial
discrimination in the "sale, leasing, rental or other disposition" of
residential accommodations in which the United States had an inter-
est.56 Low-rent. housing projects authorized by the Housing Act of
REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, August 27, 1965. See also the
Supreme Court's disposition of the issues in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 87 S.Ct.
1244 (1967).
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50. Cases in areas other than public school education have relied upon Brown
v. Board of Educ.; e.g., Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir.
1955).
51. 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
52. Note, Discrimination Against Minorities in the Federal Housing Programs,
supra note 5, at 501.
53. Prior to Brown v. Board of Educ., see accord, Jones v. City of Hamtramck,
121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing
Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Banks v. Housing Authority of
San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953); cert. denied, 347 U.S.
974 (1954); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Ch. 1954);
Seawell v. MacWithey, 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (Ch. 1949). Contra, Favors
v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Kankakee County Housing Authority
v. Spurlock, 3 Ill. 2d 277, 120 N.E.2d 561 (1954); Miers v. Housing Authority
of City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
After Brown v. Board of Educ., see accord, Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis,
226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Eleby v. City of Louisville Municipal Housing
Comm'n, Civil No. 3240, W.D. Ky., May 24, 1957, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 815
(1957); Davis v. St. Louis Housing Authority, Civil No. 8637, E.D. Mo., Dec.
25, 1955, 1 RACE REL. REP. 353 (1956). See Heyward v. Public Housing
Authority, 135 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Ga. 1955), rev'd, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956).
On remand, the same case arose as Cohen v. Public Housing Authority, 154 F.
Supp. 589 (S.D. Ga. 1957), aff'd, 257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 928 (1959).
54. See, Flipper, supra note 5, Appendix.
55. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
56. Id. at § 101.
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1937 fell within this mandate. However, the impact of the Order upon
segregation in low-rent facilities was only nominal. According to fed-
eral implementing regulations, issued by the Public Housing Adminis-
tration (PHA), only projects initially covered by an annual contribu-
tions contract executed after November 20, 1962, were subject to the
non-discrimination requirement. 57 With respect to projects adminis-
tered under a contributions contract executed prior to that date, the
Public Housing Administration merely encouraged abandonment of
discriminatory practices on the part of the local authority. 5 This
interpretation of the Order, and the enforcement of the regulations
promulgated to implement the non-discrimination requirement were
severely criticized.59
C. Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 196460 greatly extended the coverage of
the Executive Order with respect to non-discrimination in low-rent
housing. Title VI of that Act provides that "no person ... shall, on
the ground of race, ... be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
... receiving Federal financial assistance."6' Therefore, low-rent hous-
ing is subject to the federal non-discrimination prohibition and de-
pends, not upon the execution date of the annual contributions con-
57. MANUAL § 102.1 (1) (May 1963). All projects not covered by an annual
contributions contract on or before November 21, 1962 became subject to a new
contract provision. "The Local Authority shall not discriminate because of race
...in the sale, leasing, rental, or other disposition of housing or related facilities
(including land) included in any Project or Projects initially covered after Novem-
ber 20, 1962, by a contract for annual contributions under the United States Hous-
ing Act of 1937, or in the use or occupancy thereof. The Local Authority shall not,
on account of race ... deny to any eligible applicant the opportunity to lease or
rent any dwelling in any such housing suitable to its needs."
58. This position was taken with reference to the so-called "good offices" sec-
tion of the Executive Order. The MANUAL provided that "[Plursuant to Section
102 [Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527, § 102 (1962)], the Public
Housing Administration will use its good offices to promote the abandonment of
discriminatory practices with respect to projects not subject to the contract require-
ment. . . " Id. at § 102.1(3). The contract requirement is set out in MANUAL,
supra note 57.
59. Comment, Discrimination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note 1, at 871, 878,
879 (critical); Sauer, Free Choice in Housing, 10 N.Y.L.F. 525, 533-36 (1964)
(optimistic); Sloane, One Year's Experience: Current and Potential Impact of the
Housing Order, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 457, 464-66 (1964) potential scope of
Executive Order).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000a-2000h (1964).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
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tract for individual projects, but upon actual receipt of Federal finan-
cial contributions.6 2 As a result of the change from contract date to
date of actual receipt of federal assistance, the bulk of the public hous-
-ing projects not affected by the Executive Order are now subject to
Title VI.
Two tenant selection and assignment plans meet current standards
established by Housing Assistance Administration regulations promul-
gated under Title VI.63 Under the "Louisville"64 or free choice plan,
each applicant may state his preference for project accommodations.
Insofar as it administratively feasible, the local authority will assign
tenants to the projects indicated in their applications. Available units
for which no preference has been expressed will be offered to appli-
cants in order of priority.6 5 Under an alternative "first come-first
served" plan,6S the importance of applicant preference for project
accommodations is diminished. Tenants are assigned in the order
their applications are received by the authority, subject to statutory
62. Prior to the first request for funds on or after January 3, 1965, local authori-
ties are required to file with the Public Housing Administration Regional Office
a completed Form PHA-3037. This form includes a statement of the local authori-
ty's policies and practices in receiving applications, selecting tenants, and assigning
applicants to dwelling units. MANUAL § 102.1, Exhibit I (May 1965). Except for
certain specified categories of sums, the "Regional Director shall not approve any
request for funds . . . or request for execution of a further contract for financial
assistance, for any Local Authority which has failed to fi'e an acceptable Form
PHA-3037." Id. at § 102.1A(3)(b).
63. PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, CIRCULAR TO REGIONAL DIRECTORS
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, supra note 47. The CIRCULAR provides an example o
plans of the type found acceptable to the Public Housing Administration.
64. So called because it was first adopted by the City of Louisville Municipal
Housing Commission. Eleby v. City of Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n,
Civil No. 3240, W.D. Ky., May 24, 1957, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 815 (1957). The
"Plan of Integration" adopted in Louisville is reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP.
815, 816 (1957).
65. "[A]ny family who wishes to obtain housing files a registration form, on
which it may specify the project or location of its choice in any part of the City,
including alternate choices. Each registration is given a number, and all registra-
tions are kept in a permanent alphabetical file in a single Central Rental Office
for the City. When a vacancy occurs, no matter in which project, the project
office must receive a referral from the Central Rental Office, which draws from
those registrations expressing preference for the project in which the vacancy has
occurred. Among registrations with the same priority, selection is based on date
of registration, the applicant having the lower registration number taking prece-
dence." Letter from Marie C. McGuire, Comm'r, Public Housing Administration,
to The Rev. S. Jerome Hall, Chairman, The Westside Federation, Chicago, Illi-
nois, Oct. 14, 1965, p. 3, copy on file with URBAN LAW ANNUAL.
66. PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, CIRCULAR TO REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND
LOCAL AUToRTrrms, supra. note 47.
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preferences or priority. When a dwelling unit in one project is offered
to the applicant who has a first choice on that unit, he may exercise
his personal preference for another project by refusing the offered
accommodations. Under currently acceptable plans, applicants who
refuse the accommodations offered may be given one or two additional
first choices for suitable accommodations, or may be dropped imme-
diately to the bottom of the waiting list.67
Experience with these plans is limited, but several conclusions are
suggested by observation. One city, which had adopted a free choice
plan in 1957, recently switched to a first come-first served plan because
the desired change from segregated occupancy patterns in public hous-
ing throughout the city had failed to materialize.68 It would seem that
if applicants may exercise their choice of project accommodations, de
facto segregation will remain a serious problem in low-rent public
housing.69 Official recognition of this fact is contained in proposed
amendments to the tenant selection and assignment regulations under
which the free choice plan would no longer be acceptable.70
The first come-first served plan, however, is not without difficulties.
Although applicants may exercise an ultimate choice to seek dwellings
67. Id.
68. Apparently the free choice plan in Louisville had less effect upon occu-
pancy than anticipated, for it was dropped in favor of a first come-first served plan
because "in conjunction with segregated site selection," it had "resulted in only
minimal desegregation of the [Louisville] public housing projects. . . " Comment,
Discrimination in Low-Rent Housing, supra note 1, at 871, 881. Until 1957,
housing projects had been built in pairs-one for Negroes and one for whites.
The free choice plan was adopted in a context of total segregation. In a written
statement prepared in 1957, the Housing Commission of Louisville voiced its belief
that "the proposed plan (free choice plan) will not materially change the present
occupancy but will incorporate the voluntary principle." 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 817
(1957).
69. "If the people involved think that [actual segregation is essential to the
success of the program] . . . and if Negroes and whites desire to maintain volun-
tary segregation for their common good, there is certainly no law to prevent such
cooperation." Cohen v. Public Housing Authority, 257 F.2d 73, 78, (5th Cir.
1958). At an earlier stage of litigation, Heyward v. Public Housing Authority, 238
F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956), the court indicated that defendant had a free choice
plan in effect. 238 F.2d at 692.
70. Statement by Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Feb. 8, 1967, at 5. "The rules for tenant selection incident
to Title VI . . . have been strengthened. Applicants will be assigned in numerical
order, on the basis of date of application, need, and family size. Any suitable
vacancy in the localities' public housing program will be offered to an applicant.
Where there are vacancies in several projects, the unit in a project with the largest
number of vacancies will be proferred. If, after three offers, the applicant declines
to accept any of them, he will go to the bottom of the list of eligibles." No men-
tion is made of a free choice tenant selection plan.
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on the private housing market, those who are unable to do so may
only refuse offered accommodations at the risk of losing first place on
the waiting list. The consequences of refusing offered accommoda-
tions is critical to the operation of the first come-first served plan. If,
for example, the plan provides that applicants who refuse the first
offered accommodations fall to the bottom of the waiting list, the ele-
ment of personal preference for project accommodations is largely
eliminated. However, currently acceptable versions of the first come-
first served plan may provide for one or two offers of accommodations
to the applicant after his initial refusal.71 This option permits an
applicant who does not wish to live in the project accommodations
first offered to refuse them, and await the probability that suitable
accommodations next becoming available will be located in another
project in which the racial mix is more acceptable to him. Thus the
weakness of the free choice plan is re-introduced. The newly-proposed
tenant selection and assignment regulations,7 2 although they eliminate
the free choice plan, do not recognize the consequences of allowing an
applicant more than one refusal.73
71. PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, CIRCULAR TO REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND
LOCAL AUTHORITIES, supra note 47.
72. It seems that the proposed regulation may be less able to prevent tenant
"shopping" for project accommodations because of personal racial prejudices than
currently acceptable plans. The willingness of an applicant to refuse the first
offered accommodations is based largely upon his knowledge that he will have at
least another first choice for accommodations. If applicants know that if they
refuse a dwelling unit offered them they will be placed at the bottom of the wait-
ing list, they will be less likely to refuse simply because they do not want to live
in a project inhabited by Negroes. Although the current regulation permits removal
from the top of the list after the first refusal, PUBLIC HOUSING ADmINISTRATION,
CIRCULAR TO REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, supra note 47, the
proposed regulation would permit three first choices before removal to the bottom
of the waiting list. Statement by Robert Weaver, supra note 70, at 5.
73. Possible judicial responses to more direct tenant selection policies which
would attempt to secure project integration through the use of quota and forced-
assignment policies are suggested by those state and federal cases that have con-
sidered pupil and grade reassignment programs that are intended to eliminate de
facto patterns of segregation in the public schools. These programs have been
upheld against attack in the east. See Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J.
1964); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1 RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 234-36 (1967). However, the school cases do not seem analogous,
since they deal solely with programs which require a redistribution of the existing
school population. The tenant selection problem in public housing is concerned
with the assignment of prospective tenants but not the redistribution or reassign-
ment of present occupants. There is no equivalent in the public school system to a
tenant selection policy in public housing which would deny and thus defer admis-




Site selection may be the most powerful tool available to prevent
or alleviate de facto segregation in low-rent public housing. Where
Negroes predominate among eligible applicants for low-rent housing
and projects located in ghetto neighborhoods, tenant selection and
assignment schemes can do little to effect meaningful integration. Per-
haps what is needed is a broader perspective: a shift from integration
within projects to integration within the community.
Site selection is also subject to constitutional and statutory restraints.
Although the nature of these restraints is presently unknown, several
issues are presented. What, for example, are the constitutional limita-
tions on the local authority's discretion to select sites? Have statutory
directives and administrative regulations altered the range of local
authority?
A. Constitutional Limitations
Thompson v. Housing Authority of Miami74 was the first judicial
consideration of site selection as it affects de facto segregation in pub-
lic housing.75 Defendant in 1962 selected sites to relocate 2,600.fami-
lies displaced from the "Central Negro District" by urban renewal and
expressway construction. The sites chosen were located in neighbor-
hoods having Negro and white residents, a "considerable distance"
from the central Negro area.76 The Public Housing Administration
approved the sites in 1963. Thereafter, but prior to construction, the
neighborhoods turned "predominantly Negro."7 7 Plaintiff sued78 to
enjoin construction on the approved sites on the ground that defend-
ant housing authority had selected them purposely to produce de facto
segregation, 79 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In denying
74. 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
75. See also the discussion of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F.
Supp. 582 (N.D. 11. 1967), at notes 83-85, infra.
76. 251 F. Supp. at 123. The court mentions that the area where the sites
were selected "was designated by the County as the 'Northwest Transition Area.' "
If this means that the area was in the process of changing from white to Negro
rather than a stabilized mixed neighborhood, then the court should have given
more consideration to the Housing Authority's lack of good faith in selecting the
sites.
77. Id. at 123. The 1960 Census tracts showed population by both races, and
although the area was still mixed, it had turned predominantly Negro.
78. There is no indication in the case that there was more than one plaintiff,
what race the plaintiff was, nor what relation the plaintiff had to the public
housing in question.
79. 251 F. Supp. at 122. The complaint charged that the "sites were purposely
selected for the purpose of effecting de facto segregation," but the court changed
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the injunction, the court relied upon its findings that the neighbor-
hoods were still racially mixed, that the housing authority had been
motivated solely by non-racial considerations and had complied with
federal standards, that the federal agency had approved the sites, and
that Negro spokesmen and leaders, consulted prior to final selection,
had not opposed these locations.80
By finding that defendant housing authority had not acted in bad
faith and had not engaged in discriminatory practices, the court
avoided ruling on the question raised by plaintiffs-whether there are
constitutional limits on the local authority's discretion to place relo-
cation housing for Negroes in areas of racial concentration81 At the
very least, the Thompson case appears to stand for the proposition
that if the neighborhoods in which the sites are located were racially
mixed at the time of local approval, courts will not later interfere
with the local determinations -. 8 2
the wording of the issue to "fostering de facto segregation." Id. at 123. The plain-
tiff seemed to be trying to get an issue of intention to discriminate into the
charge. The court, by using the word, "fostering," turned the issue from the
factual question of whether there was an intent to discriminate, which presumably
would be unconstitutional, to the undecided constitutional question of whether
de facto segregation violates the 14th Amendment, when the facts clearly showed
de facto segregation.
80. Id. at 124.
81. The court said, "if this argument is accepted [location in a predominantly
Negro area as de facto segregation] then it is equally true that the location of public
housing units in any predominantly White area would also constitute de facto
segregation." Id. at 124. The court ignores the fact that patterns of housing
segregation have normally meant denial of entry to Negroes, not whites.
Site selection in schools has also met with little litigation. In Henry v. Godsell,
165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958), the court dismissed a complaint alleging
discrimination in the selection of a new school site in a predominantly Negro area.
See also Scaly v. Department of Public Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa.
1957), aff'd. 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
82. Site selection may be reviewed by the courts on a motion to dismiss con-
demnation proceedings instituted by a housing authority. The issue before the
court on the motion is whether the housing authority was capricious or arbitrary
in condeming the condemnee's land. If the motion to dismiss contains allegations
which, if true, would constitute a bar to the condemnation proceeding, a triable
issue of fact has been presented. Housing Authority of City of Wilson v. Wooten,
257 N.C. 358, 126 S.E.2d 101 (1962) (motion to dismiss alleging failure of
authority to condemn slum sites held insufficient); Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress
Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961) (motion to dismiss alleging
that condemnor acted solely to prevent development of a racially integrated private
housing subdivision held to present issue of fact). Ordinarily, the scope of judicial
review in these cases is quite narrow. See also Philbrook v. Chapel Hill Housing
Authority, 153 S.E.2d 153 (N.C. 1967), dismissing an action brought to enjoin




Additional light on judicial power to review public housing site
selections alleged to create racially segregated patterns is provided by
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.83 Plaintiff's complaint al-
leged that the Authority, since 1950, had selected sites which were
almost exclusively within neighborhoods that were substantially en-
tirely Negro. Violations of constitutional Due Process protections and
the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 were claimed. On defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court dismissed the complaint in-
sofar as it rested on a site selection policy not motivated by a deliber-
ate attempt to create patterns of racial segregation.81 The court
pointed out that "A public housing program, consciously administered
in accord with the statutory mandates surrounding its inception and
free of any intent or purpose, however slight, to segregate the races,
cannot be condemned even though it may not affirmatively achieve
alterations in existing practices of racial concentration in housing."' s
B. Statutory Restrictions
Limitations on judicial review of the site selection process again
suggests the need for more positive administrative intervention. Fed-
eral regulations adopted under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 initially provided that local authorities should aim to select
from otherwise suitable sites those that afford the "greatest accep-
tability" to eligible applicants regardless of race, color, creed, or
national origin.86 How this policy operated can be illustrated by a
more detailed review of the site selection policies in the City of Chi-
cago, which eventually were presented for judicial consideration in
the Gautreaux case.
In April, 1965, the City Council of Chicago approved seven low-rent
housing sites, all of which *Were located on Chicago's South and West
Sides in areas of high Negro concentration.87 Pending federal ap-
83. 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
84. This is the inference to be derived from the court's failure to dismiss those
counts of the complaint which alleged a deliberate motivation to create patterns
of segregation. Complaint, pp. 11, 12. These counts were returned for trial.
85. 265 F. Supp. at 584. There has been some recognition of an affirmative
duty to integrate in the school segregation cases. See Jackson v. Pasadena City
School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 818 (1963). But see Fiss, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concept 78 HAv. L. REv. 564 (1965).
86. MANUAL § 205.1(4)(g) (Sept. 1965).
87. "[Chicago] City Council approval of sites is required as a matter of state
law .... " Letter from Marie C. McGuire to the Westside Federation, supra note
65, at 5.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
proval, the Westside Federation submitted s s a complaint to the Hous-
ing and Home Finance Agency alleging that site selection "within the
confines of the Negro community"' 9 when non-whites constituted 93%
of those waiting for low-rent housing90 violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and federal administrative criteria governing site
selection. Specifically, the complaint alleged impairment of objectives
of the low-rent housing program,91 perpetuation of racial patterns of
residence in Chicago,92 violations of the Chicago city plan,9s and in-
tensification of segregation within projects.9 4
In response,95 the federal public housing agency stated that new
public housing would have a rehabilitative effect upon surrounding
neighborhoods, and so would further the objectives of the federal
public housing act.96 In addition, the "greatest acceptability" stan-
88. Letter from Westside Federation to Robert Weaver, Adm'r, Housing and
Home Finance Agency, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 1, unsigned copy on file with URBAN
LAw ANNUAL. (Westside Federation is an organization representing 49 community
and neighborhood groups on the West Side of Chicago.) See also, Testimony of
Chicago Urban League before Committee on Planning and Housing, Chicago City
Council (April 6, 1965).
89. Letter from Westside Federation to Robert Weaver, supra note 88, at 1.
90. Non-whites constitute 23 per cent of Chicago's population, yet comprise
90 per cent of all public housing tenants and 93 per cent of public housing appli-
cants. Letter from Westside Federation to Robert Weaver, supra note 88, at 2;
Flipper, supra note 5, Appendix.
91. This argument was based upon the assumption that the site selection vio-
lated Housing and Home Finance Agency regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1964),
and Public Housing Administration criteria, MANUAL § 205.1(4) (g) (Sept.
1965).
92. The complaint alleged that restricting low-rent projects to the "Negro
community" would reinforce private pressures against racial freedom of residence,
and thus inhibit the possibility of residential integration in Chicago.
93. "[T]he city will seek to change these trends [toward racial neighborhood
patterns] and to achieve harmonious, stabilized neighborhoods attractive to fami-
lies of all races. . . ." Quoted from Basic Policies for the Comprehensive Plan of
Chicago by the City Planning Department in Letter from Westside Federation to
Robert Weaver, supra note 88, at 5.
94. This statement apparently was based upon the fact that 93 per cent of
public housing applicants in Chicago are non-white. Westside Federation alleged
that each project having over 90 per cent Negro occupancy was, by definition,
segregated. Letter from Westside Federation to Robert Weaver, supra note 88, at
3. It is not clear how site selection could make a substantial difference in the
preponderance of Negroes in projects, given the lop-sided characteristics of the
waiting list.
95. Letter from Marie C. McGuire to the Westside Federation, supra note 65.
96. The letter cited the written report of the Department of City Planning
submitted to the City Council Committee on Planning and Housing. The report
stated that development of the proposed sites "[would] be a forward step in the
city's continuing program of improving its housing supply." Id. at 60. For the
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dard was cited.97 Since no alternative sites were suggested at public
hearings held before a City Council Committee, 5 apparently there
were no "otherwise available and suitable site.""" Because approxi-
mately 90 per cent of low-rent housing applicants had specified a pref-
erence under Chicago's free choice plan for project accommodations
on the South and West Sides, the federal agency found that the sites
met the "greatest acceptability" test.100 Furthermore, since no addi-
tional sites had been suggested, the Department of City Planning gave
approval of the sites as conforming to the city plan.1 1 Under these cir-
cumstances-induding the known hostility of the City Council to low-
rent housing on the North Side02-the federal agency concluded that
the Housing Authority had "made a sincere effort"103 and had done its
best to select sites "most nearly meet[ing]" federal requirementsl °4
importance of rehabilitation of substandard neighborhoods see Statement of Robert
C. Weaver, supra note 70, at 3.
97. Letter from Marie C. McGuire to the Westside Federation, supra note 65,
at 4, citing MANUAL § 205.1(4) (g) (Sept. 1965). A subsequent revision of the
so-called "greatest acceptability" test is discussed in the text at notes 107-113 infra.
98. In fact, two separate hearings were held. The first, on April 1, 1965, was
held before the City Plan Commission, which approved the sites and cited prior
approval by the Department of City Planning. The second hearing was held on
April 6, 1965, before the City Council Committee on Planning and Housing. Com-
plaints similar to those raised by the Westside Federation were presented by the
Chicago Urban League at these hearings. See, Testimony of the Chicago Urban
League before Committee on Planning and Housing, Chicago City Council, supra
note 88.
99. Even though it had not suggested additional sites at the hearings, appar-
ently the Chicago Housing Authority felt that others might be available to it. The
Public Housing Administration defended the Housing Authority for not suggest-
ing additional sites, because they were located in the same general area as the
sites under protest, and would be subject to the same criticism. Letter from Marie
C. McGuire to the Westside Federation, supra note 65, at 6.
100. Of the 10,072 non-elderly Negro family applicants, 94 per cent expressed
a preference for project accommodations on the South and West sides of Chicago.
Only 45 per cent of the 642 white family applicants expressed preferences for
project accommodations in the same areas. Id. at 5. The fallacy of the Public
Housing Administration argument is seeri when the nature of "preferences" is con-
sidered. An applicant's expression of project accommodations indicates his selec-
tion from among exiting public housing stock, and does not reflect a vote in favor
of additional project sites.
101. Id. Conformance to the city plan is also required under federal adminis-
trative regulations. MANUAL § 205.1(4) (c) (1) (May 1965).
102. Candidly, the Public Housing Administration admitted that "sites other
than in the South or West side, if proposed for regular family housing, invariably
encounter sutflciefit objection in the [City] Council to preclude Council approval."
Letter from Marie C. McGuire to the Westside Federation, supra note 65, at 6.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 6.
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and that to withhold approval would constitute an "arbitrary denial
of . . . housing" to Chicago's needy. 105
Especially in a city in which political resistance to an active pro-
gram of integration in public housing is considerable,06 the principal
effect of the federal interpretation of its site selection criteria is to dis-
able any local attempts to deal with the de facto segregation problem.
However, changes in the federal regulations governing site selection
criteria may force a reappraisal of federal attitudes. Two major
changes were made in the amended regulations. First, site selection
must achieve the "greatest opportunity" for the "inclusion of eligible
applicants of all groups regardless of race. '" 10 7 Note that the standard
of "acceptability" has been dropped. Second, site selection must af-
ford "members of minority groups an opportunity to locate outside
areas of concentration of their own minority group."'' os The new cri-
teria considerably strengthen the nondiscrimination requirements of
the federal regulations, and meet to some extent the objections raised
in Chicago.109
The location of sites in areas of racial concentration will prima facie
be unacceptable.110 If the local authority bears successfully its burden
of proof by showing that "no acceptable sites are available outside
the areas of racial concentration," the federal agency will reconsider its
rejection.", Should the local authority fail to show the unavailability
of other sites, it must submit for approval "alternative or additional
sites in other areas so as to provide more balanced distribution of the
proposed housing."12
At best, the substitution of the new regulation for the "greatest
acceptability" test indicates increased official recognition of the sub-
tleties of site selection. Many issues remain unresolved. For example,
what is an "area of racial concentration?" Should the federal agency
define in objective terms what is an area of racial concentration, or
should it accept, upon review, the finding of the local housing author-
ity if there is "substantial evidence" to support the finding? The
105. Id. at 7.
106. For an early description of the difficulties in placing housing projects in
white areas in Chicago see M. MEYERSON AND E. BANFIELD, POLITICS, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST (1955).
107. MANUAL § 205.1(4)(g) (Feb. 1967).
108. Id.
109. Letter from Westside Federation to Robert Weaver, supra note 88, at 5.





regulation applies to sites which are selected only in areas of racial
concentration.113 Does this standard mean that as long as the local
authority chooses at least one site outside an area of racial concentra-
tion it is immune from attack under this provision?
The standard of proof required of a local authority to show that
no acceptable sites are available outside the area of racial concentra-
tion is unclear. There is no definition of an "acceptable" site, and
local authorities and governing bodies may well be racially influenced
in deciding whether or not a given site is unacceptable. If the federal
agency is too willing to credit the findings of local agencies, the new
regulations may not mark a significant departure from the regulations
in effect when the Westside Federation protested the location of pub-
lic housing sites in Chicago.
IV. CONCLUSION
Experience with attempts to deal with de facto patterns of discrimi-
nation in public housing have met with considerable frustration. Ju-
dicial reluctance to find constitutional violations in the absence of
deliberate motivation to encourage segregated patterns makes it diffi-
cult to control decisions on site selection, which appear to provide the
best leverage over the segregation problem. Federal regulations im-
posing site selection criteria may have been formally strengthened, but
how effective they will be in operation is still open to question.
Effective programs of tenant selection are inhibited, not only by
the location of many existing projects in areas of high racial concen-
tration, aid by economic and demographic pressures which create
highly disproportionate ratios of Negro eligibles for public housing
projects, but also by serious limitations on what is constitutionally
permissible by way of administrative and statutory answers to the seg-
regation problem. Uncertainties about judicial acceptance of quota
systems seriously limit any experimentation with forced-assignment
policies, which must necessarily incorporate a quota. Nor is there any
indication that the concentration of Negroes in the city core will de-
crease in the near future to any considerable extent.
Probably the best hope for improved racial patterns in public hous-
ing lies in institutional changes in the public housing program. Large-
scale public housing projects have been subject to severe criticism on
grounds not associated with racial issues. Experiments are under way
113. Id.
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which may lead to an alteration in the public housing concept, with
public housing authorities concentrating on the leasing of individual
units throughout the community, and the construction and operation
of smaller projects. Integration by projects, when projects are built
on a small scale, is not meaningful. As public housing units penetrate
the community, the integration of minorities into residential neigh-
borhoods through occupation of individual dwellings and smaller
multi-family units may in time provide the most effective opportunity
for dealing with patterns of housing segregation.
George T. Wolf
Donald L. Shriver
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